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Income-tax Department
Edited

by

Stephen G. Rusk

Upon reviewing the court decisions on federal tax matters during the
period between May 14th and June 6th of this year, the startling fact became
apparent that out of forty-five cases brought to court the taxpayer won a
favorable adjudication in only nine.
When it is remembered that before these controversies reached the courts
the contentions were carefully considered by the commissioner and the United
States board of tax appeals, it seems strange that the contending taxpayers’
cases were not sufficiently clarified to render possible settlement without
recourse to the courts.
Confronted with this remarkable situation, a number of questions impress
themselves upon one’s mind. Are the courts captious? Some of the decisions
seem to indicate that such is the case. Are the taxpayers captious? A con
siderable number of the cases indicates this to be the fact. Are the laws
ambiguous, and does the language need interpretation? It appears so from
reading the arguments and conclusions at law in a number of cases.
If the cases reviewed within the period mentioned are typical of results that
can be expected by taxpayers, then it would seem in the interest of prudence
not to contest the commissioner’s findings. A gamble of one chance to win
out of five seems not alluring to one who has real money at stake.
Another fact worthy of consideration is that in almost every case of litiga
tion the commissioner’s attorney must prove the righteousness of his conten
tions by cross-examining the plaintiff’s witnesses. Very seldom does he present
any witnesses on behalf of the commissioner, but, with a few items of docu
mentary evidence and the witnesses for the plaintiff, he seems to have no diffi
culty in refuting the claims which have been carefully thought out, presented
with thoroughness and zealously urged. It does not seem possible that the
government’s attorneys can exceed the practitioners in ability and knowledge
of the law, yet commissioner’s attorneys are handicapped also by lack of time
to familiarize themselves with each case they must try. In many cases
they go before the court after only a hurried reading of the data at issue and
must gather during the presentation of the case by the opposing attorney all
the knowledge of it that they can hope to obtain.
Under these conditions the fact that they win four out of five cases seems to
be a noteworthy achievement and, it is believed, should be food for thought for
the tax practitioners.
One eminent lawyer recently advised his client that there would be little to
be gained by carrying a case to a court which reviewed decisions of the United
States board of tax appeals, inasmuch as the court knew little of income taxes
and would hesitate to reverse a decision of the board because the latter knew so
much more about the subject than the court—not that the board’s decision
could be considered accurate in the instant case, but that it was too wild a
gamble to take that the court would get at the root of the matter.
A final thought upon the subject is to the effect that if there were fewer trivial
controversies taken to the courts for decision, there would be a greater chance
for meritorious cases to be adjudicated properly.
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A great deal has been said and written about the simplification of the incometax laws, but it seems that the law is just as abstruse to the vast majority as
was the act of 1917. One lawyer acknowledged to a puzzled client, who pro
tested to him about the involved language used to convey a certain thought, that
the language was that of lawyers; that it was written by lawyers, and was for
lawyers. Knowing, then, that the judges are lawyers; that the opposing
counsel are lawyers, why should a mere taxpayer venture into such a beclouded
atmosphere seeking a clarification of his tax questions?

SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS
A capital-stock bonus paid to the state of Pennsylvania on an increase of
capital stock is not deductible, the Pennsylvania courts having ruled that such
bonus is not a tax. (District court of the U. S., W. D. of Pennsylvania.
Greensburg Coal Company v. U. S. of A.)
A cash dividend declared in 1924 by a national bank used to pay for stock of
a trust company under an agreement between the bank and the majority of
the stockholders to allow dividends payable to them to be so used, constitutes a
taxable dividend to such majority stockholders.
A reorganization within the meaning of sec. 203 (c) and (h), act of 1924, was
not effected where a cash dividend declared by a national bank was used to pur
chase stock of a trust company organized to carry on business which the na
tional bank was not authorized to do under an agreement between the bank and
the majority of its stockholders to allow dividends payable to them to be so
used, such section not applying to the organization of an independent company
engaging in dealings prohibited to the original company nor the application of
dividends which, when declared, are the property of the stockholders, the sec
tion presuming a transfer of assets by the corporation itself. (U. S. circuit
court of appeals, eighth circuit. John G. Lonsdale v. Commissioner.)
Evidence of March 1, 1913, value of real property acquired by a corporation
prior thereto, and carried on its books at the assessed value for local taxation
purposes should be considered in determining gain or loss on the sale thereof in
1919. B. T. A. affirming the commissioner's determination for lack of proof
is reversed to allow both the taxpayer and the commissioner to offer competent
proof as to the fair market value of the properties on March 1, 1913.
The evidence was held to establish that a transaction was a purchase of
securities on behalf of others, and not a sale resulting in taxable gain. (Circuit
court of appeals, second circuit. Bessemer Investment Co. v. Commissioner.)
Dividends declared and paid in 1919 as of December 5, 1917, under a court
order directing a distribution from cash surplus on hand on July 31, 1916, are
taxable income to the recipients in 1919 and not in 1917. (U. S. circuit court
of appeals, sixth circuit. Alice G. Kales v. Fred L. Woodworth, collector.)
Invested capital at the beginning of the taxable year 1917 of a taxpayer on
the accrual basis should be reduced by the amount of federal income taxes for
1916.
Invested capital for 1917 should be reduced on account of a tentative tax
computed on net income in determining the amount available for the payment
of dividends in such year where the books are kept on the accrual basis, and,
where the amount of profits for the first six months of the year is shown, the
average for such six months, instead of the average for the full twelve months,
should be taken in computing the amount of the reduction of invested capital
for 1917 by reason of dividend payments during such period. (Court of claims.
American Bronze Powder Mfg. Co. v. U. S.)
Interest paid by joint-stock land banks organized under the federal farm-loan
act of July 17, 1916, on joint-stock land-bank bonds issued and sold in accord
ance with the provisions of such act, and secured by farmers’ promissory notes
deposited with the proper farm-loan registrars, the proceeds of which bonds
were used in making new loans to farmers, is deductible, the exception of sec.
234 (a) (2) as to interest on indebtedness to purchase or carry tax-exempt se
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curities not applying. (Court of claims. The First National Bank of Chicago,
a National Banking Association, v. The United States.)
Loss sustained in 1917 on its investment in the stock of and on an open ac
count due from a corporation which liquidated in 1917, is not deductible for
excess-profits-tax purposes, by a corporation owning all the stock of such corpo
ration. (Court of claims, Utica Knitting Co. v. The United States.)
Amounts determined by the commissioner as a reasonable allowance for
salaries paid to its officers by a close corporation in 1920 and 1921 were held to
be reasonable, on the record, in the absence of an express contract for services,
and judged from the viewpoint of profits made. (U. S. court of claims,
J. Livingston & Co. v. The United States.)
That portion of the amounts received in 1920 and 1921 as salary by an officer
of a close corporation which was disallowed by the commissioner as a salary
deduction to the corporation on the ground that it was unreasonable and repre
sented a dividend payment, though in no way predicated on stockholdings, is
taxable in the hands of the recipient as salary, such sums having been received
by the officer as salary, and not as dividends. (U. S. court of claims. John
ston Livingston v. The United States.)
A claim for refund of 1917 taxes alleging that stock dividends received in
that year are not taxable income is not an amendment to a prior claim for
refund alleging that such stock dividends should have been allocated to years
other than 1917.
A credit is allowed within the meaning of the statute when the commissioner
signed the schedule of refunds and credits as reported by the collector, under
an inscription authorizing the disbursing clerk to make payment, and refund
of an admitted overpayment of 1917 taxes, collected by the allowance of a
credit against an overassessment, should be made where the claim for refund
was filed within four years of the date of the allowance for such credit. (U. S.
court of claims. Swift & Co. v. The United States.)
A letter in protest of a proposed assessment of additional taxes is not a claim
for refund. (U. S. court of claims. Semmes Motor Co. v. The United States.)
The excess of the allowance for amortization of war facilities, apportioned by
the commissioner to the taxable year 1918, over the taxable net income for such
year was allowed as a deduction in determining net income for 1919, sec. 234
(a) (8), act of 1918, giving the taxpayer the right to have the sums allowed as
amortization deducted until the allowance is exhausted. (U. S. court of
claims. Walter C. Palmer, trustee in bankruptcy of The Racine Auto Tire Co.
v. The United States.)
The proceeds of life-insurance policy issued on the life of a decedent, payable
to his estate, should not be included in the decedent’s gross estate where he had
assigned such policy to his wife, since by such assignment, the decedent was
divested of all right and title to the policy and was without authority to change
the beneficiary or to exercise any control over the policy. The words
"all other beneficiaries” do not apply to the assignee of a policy payable to a
designated beneficiary.
The proceeds of life-insurance policies issued on the life of a decedent, payable
to his estate, should be included in his gross estate. (U. S. court of claims.
Martha A. Guettel and Arthur Guettel, individually, and Martha A. Guettel and
Henry A. Auerbach, trustees for Edward Guettel under the will of Henry A.
Guettel, deceased, v. The United States.)
A distributee is not entitled to deduct, from income derived from securities
prematurely distributed to her by the executor of an estate in process of ad
ministration, that portion of the federal estate tax paid in 1919 and deducted
from the income of the estate by the executor, but contributed by the distrib
utee under an agreement with the executor at the time of the transfer to
meet promptly estate liabilities. (U. S. court of claims. Eda Matthieson v.
The United States.)
An order of a district court requiring a witness to appear before an internal
revenue agent and testify and to produce certain papers during an investiga
tion relative to the tax liability of another is appealable.

56

Income-tax Department
The power of the commissioner of internal revenue, under sec. 1104, act of
1926, and the corresponding provisions of prior and subsequent acts, to examine
corporate books and papers is analogous to the power vested by analogous
statutes in the federal grand jury to perform similar acts, and the fact that the
corporation whose books and papers are required to be produced is not under
investigation is immaterial. (Circuit court of appeals, eighth circuit. G. W.
Brownson v. U. S. of America.)
A corporation may not deduct in 1919 amounts representing a portion of
1919 earnings credited on its books to certain employees under an agreement
to pay to each of such employees as additional compensation for 1919 a per
centage of the net profits for 1919, subject to the conditions that such sums
were to remain in and at the risk of the business and subject to pro-rata deduc
tion for losses incurred during the period of five years, and could not be with
drawn unless authorized by the president and unless the employee remained in
the employ of the corporation during the entire period, since the events deter
mining the liability of the corporation to its employees could not occur until
the expiration of the five-year period. (Court of appeals, District of Columbia.
5. Naitove & Co. v. Commissioner.)
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